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In the budget speech for Appropriate Bill in 1999’ Hong Kong Government 
announced its intention to partially privatize the Mass Transit Railway Corporation a 
wholly government-owned statutory corporation that operates as a separate 
commercial entity. On 23'^  February 2000, the bill of MTRC privatization was passed 
in the LEGCO; with some minority resistance from the Democratic Party who had 
concerns over the retention ofan autonomous fare-setting mechanism ofthe MTRC. 
As the Financial Secretary stated that MTRC privatization would be an historical 
event in Hong Kong. Being a high-grade public utility company，the listing of MTRC 
shares in the Hong Kong stock exchange will attract domestic and foreign investors' 
interest and provide a balance in the categories of stocks listed. Anyhow, he never 
hid the main objective of this privatization is to raise around 30 billion HKD to reduce 
the budget deficit ofthe HK SAR government. 
Transportation is always classified as a strategic industry and MTRC itself is a 
dominant player in the transportation industry of Hong Kong. Established in 1975, 
MTRC operates four interconnected urban rail lines and the Airport Railway with 
daily patronage of over 2.4 million. Currently it owns a 25% of the transportation 
market and it has a distinguished right in setting fares autonomously without the 
required consent from the LEGCO members. 
MTRC has earned a solid operating record in comparing with other urban transit 
systems in the world. It is amongst the most efficient and profitable urban transit 
systems with credit rating identical to the sovereign rating of HKSAR government. 
Ever since the first day, Government equity has helped to propel the expansion of 
• • • 
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the mass transit railway network, at a cost of capital lower than that obtainable from 
the capital markets. 
In view of its impressive operational and management records, doubts have been 
raised regarding the company future after the privatization. The financial and social 
impact is far from being understood. Also the public acceptance of the MTRC 
privatization can pave the way for more privatization projects in the other 
departments of the Hong Kong government. 
This project report intends to investigate the factors contributing to the success of 
MTRC in the past and explore the various financial and social impacts after the 
privatization. The continuation of the MTRC success story is important in order to 
provide high quality service at reasonable cost to the Hong Kong public and to 
strengthen the status of Hong Kong as the financial center ofAsia. 
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HISTORY OF MASS TRANSIT RAILWAY 
It was in May 1972 that the story of Hong Kong's Mass Transit Railway began. The 
Hong Kong Government at that time decided the construction of an underground 
mass transit railway to augment with the surface public transportation as designed 
by the Consulting Engineers, Freeman Fox & Partners. The public announcement of 
the Mass Transit Railway was made in the Legislative Council on June 7 1972 by 
the then Financial Secretary, the Hon C.P. Haddon-Cave. Whilst the government 
had already approved the basic design and alignment of the railway system, no 
decision has been made at that instance on the manner in which the railway should 
be financed, constructed and operated. To take a decision that could cater the views 
and proposals of different interest groups, the government established a Steering 
Group chaired by the Financial Secretary, and with the Director of Public Works, 
Commissioner for Transport, Accountant General, Deputy Economic Secretary and 
a senior member of Hong Kong Bank as members. 
Fox report recommended a mass transit system with a total length of 52.7km, 
comprising 4 lines, 3 in Kowloon and 1 in Hong Kong. The government decided to 
construction the first phase with a route length of 20km，called the Initial System. 
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Large scale surveys, ground investigations and environmental studies were then 
conducted. 
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Illustration 1: New Airport Line Train (Left) and Lantau Line Train (Right) 
In 1973, the government accepted the bid from a Japanese consortium that would 
be the sole contractor of the Initial System. The MTR Provisional Authority was set 
up and a Letter of Intent for a fixed price contract was signed in February 1974. 
However, the Japanese consortium withdrew in January 1975 for it found itself 
unable to comply with the terms. MTR Provisional Authority then announced plans 
for a reduced version of Initial System to be called the Modified Initial System. The 
concept of single contract was abandoned and the work was divided into 35 sub 
contracts. The Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) was also established on 
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September 26 1975 under the Mass Transit Railway Ordinance to take over the role 
of construct and operate a mass transit railway system from the Provisional 
Authority. 
The Modified Initial System consisted of 15 stations between Central and Kwun 
Tong. Construction began on November 1975 and was completed by three stages 
between October 1979 and February 1980. About 8,100 workers were employed by 
contractors during the peak of construction period. This was about 12% of total 
construction work force in Hong Kong. 
The Modified Initial System was followed by the Tsuen Wan Extension (10.5km，10 
stations) in 1982 and the Island Line (12.5km，14 stations) in 1986. A further 
extension was completed in 1989 when the Kwun Tong Line was extended across 
the harbor along the East Harbor Tunnel. 
In July 1998, a new 34km Airport Railway was in operation. The Airport Railway 
provides two separate rail services on common tracks: a dedicated, all-seated 
Airport Express Line and a domestic Tung Chung Line. 
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Illustration 2: MTRC Route Map 
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RAILWAY OPERATIONS 
The MTRC currently operates a 79 km railway system served by a network of 44 
stations on five inter-link lines. In 1998, the corporation carried a total of 794m 
passengers, an average of 2.3 m in weekday. The heavy daily passenger loading is 
a result of the routing of Kwun Tong, Tsuen Wan and Island lines through the most 
densely populated residential and commercial areas in the territory. In 1999, MTRC 
had a 25.2% of market share in the total franchised public transport passenger trips 
in Hong Kong. In the cross-harbor crossing, MTRC market share was even close to 
60%. 
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Illustration 3: Hong Kong's Public Transport Market as of December 1998 
The MTRC's railway operations are facing increasing competition from other modes 
of public transport following improvements in bus services and road conditions. 
Local bus operators are now more willing to offer passengers improved services like 
air-conditioned buses with more frequent trips. MTRC competitive edges are now 
mainly on safety, convenience, reliability and speed. 
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To date, the Asian economic turmoil has had relatively little impact on the MTRC's 
railway operations. Fare revenue growth will likely be affected by the local economic 
slowdown. However, the corporation's strategic importance to Hong Kong's 
transportation system will continuously ensure it with a relatively stable passenger 
volume. 
Going forward, there remains strong demand for underground transit services In 
Hong Kong, given traffic congestion during peak hours. Over the long term, MTRC 
should maintain its dominant position in Hong Kong's transport system. 
Airport Railway 
The Airport Railway, which comprises the Airport Express Line (AEL) and Tung 
Chung Line (TCL), commenced operations in July 1998. Because of Hong Kong's 
slow economic conditions, the decline in tourism and the slow pace of property 
development along the TCL, fewer people used the Airport Railway in the first year 
than had been budgeted for. The operating was below the original earnings forecast 
due to intense competition from other modes of transport and the lower-than-
expected usage of the airport. AEL was capable to capture 23,000 patronage daily 
through marketing campaigns and promotional fare discounts. This was 
approximately 1/3 of the market share for the transport traveling to/from the Airport. 
The corporation's strategy was to gradually reduce the discounts currently offered to 
passengers. Going forward, the AEL is expected to benefit from the Asian economic 
recovery, which should have the effect of increasing usage of the Chek Lap Kok 
Airport. Furthermore, the corporation should also capture a higher patronage level 
due to higher occupancy levels in properties along the TCL. 
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Illustration 4:Market Share for Modes of Transport Traveling to/from the Airport 1998 
PROPERTY & OTHER BUSINESSES 
In conjunction with railway construction, MTRC also develops residential and other 
properties above stations and depots. The Hong Kong Government has granted the 
corporation preferential property development rights to purchase land for these 
property developments albeit based on market valuations. The MTRC, in turn, 
invites property development companies to fund all the development costs, including 
land premium, construction costs and finance charges, and to bear all the 
development risks. Profits are then shared between the MTRC and developers; a 
minimum share of profits is sometimes paid to the MTRC in advance. 
The MTRC also enjoys steady rental income from its own investment properties, 
mainly retail and car park spaces. These are invariably located above or adjacent to 
MTR stations. More than 200 kiosks, shops and bank outlets in its stations are 
leased out. They are in good locations so rental income has not been seriously 
impacted by the general downturn in Hong Kong's property market. The MTRC's 
management says that, as of June 1998，99% of its investment properties portfolio 
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was occupied, while the delinquency rate for rental payments amounts to less than 
0.5%. A slight increase in rental income is expected due to increasing lettable space 
in MTRC's investment property portfolio. The MTRC also generates income from 
providing engineering consultancy and travel services. 
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CHAPTER II 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF MTRC 
The Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) is one of the very few underground 
mass transit railways in the world which earns unsubsidized fare revenue sufficient 
to cover all costs, including depreciation, plus an operating profit margin. 
Despite its strong government backing, MTRC management operates independently 
under prudent commercial principles when it comes to setting the corporation's 
financial policies, borrowing plans, and fares. Both Moody's and Standard & Poor's 
rate MTRC at Hong Kong's sovereign ceiling of A3/A. Because of its strong ratings 
and depth of reputation, MTRC is recognized as a premier borrower. Credit 
concerns about the MTRC center not much on the corporation itself - its financial 
profile is satisfactory and implicit government support is strong 一 but rather, mainly, 
on macroeconomic considerations, including the impact of the slowdown in 
economic growth in Hong Kong and China. 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE & PROFITABIUTY BEFORE 1999 
The MTRC is one of the most profitable railway companies in the world. Table 1 
summarizes the impressive performance of MTRC from 1996 to 1998. 
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Fiscal Turnover f ^ Operating EBITDA EBITDA/ Gross Net~~ 
Year (HK$ Profit Margins (HK$ Interest Debt Asset 
、 Mln) (HK$ (%) mln) Cost (HK$ (HK$ 
[T]|n} mln) mln) 
1996 6,171 1,535 24.9 3,340 3.23 12.696 35,473 
1997 6,574 2,783 42.3 3,529 3.85 10,875 41,815 
1998 6,981 2,819 40.4 3,301 2.87 16,897 42,601 
Source: MTRC financials 
Table1: Financial Summary ofthe MTRC (1996-1998) 
The overall impressive performance result has been contributed by the following 
factors : 
71 High market share in public transportation 
MTRC commands a significant share (around 25%) of Hong Kong's 
transportation market and dominates the cross-harbour crossing segment. It also 
operates the only rail link to the airport. 
2. High operating efficiency 
According to the Union of International Transport Operators ( survey results as 
shown in table 2 )，M T R C is an indisputable industry leader in terms of: 
(a) train density or passengers carried per route kilometer; 
(b) train reliability or percentage of passenger journeys on time; 
(c) cost efficiency or fare revenue per total cost. 
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MTRC，S SUPERIOR OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
~~MTRC~~ No.2 ~~Mean~~ Medium Sample 
‘ Size 
Transit density 19.0 12.4 7.4 5.4 9 
(million per route 
km) 
Train reliability (%) 99.7 97.5 95.9 96.0 6 
Cost Efficiency (x) 7.0 3.3 2.9 2.7 9 
Source: Union oflnternational Transport Operators 
Table 2: MTRC Operating Performance 
3. Sophisticated and prudent management 
The MTRC's management had a long proven track record both operationally and 
financially. MTRC has been named Best Company in Hong Kong two years in a 
row in a survey among Asia's leading companies. 
4. Supplemental revenue contributions 
1996 1997 1998 
Fare revenue 82.3 79.0 77.9 
Kiosk rental & g；^  ^ ^ 
station advertising 
Property rental ^ 8 8 9 4 
『:operty"""“ 0^ 0.6 0.6 
Management 
Source: MTRC financials 
Table 3: Revenue composition of MTRC (1996-1998) 
MTRC generates high quality revenues from : 
(a) the development of residential and commercial properties above stations 
(b) the rental of kiosks 
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(c) advertising space at its stations 
GOVERNMENT PROVISIONS TO MTRC OPERATIONS 
The Hong Kong SAR government has granted MTRC the preferential right to 
purchase the land used for property developments based on their market valuation. 
MTRC's practice in property development has been to arrange for various third-party 
developers, under the supervision of MTRC, to carry out the actual development 
work. The developers have funded the development costs, including land premium, 
construction costs, and finance charges, and have borne all development risks. 
Lease revenues and the net proceeds from sales of completed developments are 
then shared between MTRC and the developers in agreed proportions, with any 
agreed minimum share to MTRC usually paid in advance by the developers, with no 
possibility of refund. In certain instances, MTRC would also consider taking 
possession of part of the completed development as profit sharing in kind. 
71 Favorable regulatory environment 
While MTRC is a government-owned entity, it operates independently and prudently 
on commercial merits as the MTRC ordinance dictates. Although the government 
provides no subsidy to MTRC, MTRC has the tight to autonomously adjust fares 
based on commercial considerations, including costs, inflation and competition. 
71 Strong and continued support from the government 
MTRC is a public utility company that is wholly owned by the Hong Kong SAR 
government. The strong support it enjoys from the government is evidenced by the 
government's equity injection into the company between 1995 and 1997，the 
property development rights and the dividend payment waiver when needed. The 
government appoints MTRC's chairman, CEO, and members of the board; in turn, 
the company's management works closely with the government on a range of 
important working issues, including urban planning. 
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FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN 1999 
HKD (million) ] ^ 1^^? 
Turnover OW^ 7,252 
Troflt m property 1,419 2.030 
developments 
Operating profit before 4,720 5,523 
depreciation and interest 
charges 
Depreciation 1,426 2,039 
Interest charges 475 1,104 
Profit after depreciation 2,819 2,116 
and interest charges (including 264 mln 
staff separation 
payments) 
Number of passengers 
- U r b a n and Tung Chung 794 779 
lines 
- A i r p o r t Express 4 W 
Proportion~"of franchised 25.7% 25.2% 
public transport boardings 
Debt/equity ratio 39.7% 51.4% 
Source: MTRC financials 
Table 4: 1999 Results ofthe MTRC 
Table 4 has summarized the 1999 highlights of the financial amd operating results of 
MTRC. During 1999, the MTRC reported its final results with net profit declining 25% 
from 1998 toHKD2.116bn. 
Despite higher operating profit coming from property developments, the decline in 
1999 profit was largely attributed to a sharp increase in depreciation expenses and 
finance charges related to the newly completed Airport Railway; higher by 613 mln 
and 629 mln respectively. 
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Despite the decline in profit, the MTRC's core operating performance remained 
stable. Fare revenue and total number of passengers remained at similar levels of 
1998. The management has also been successful in containing costs in a difficult 
operating environment. 
FINANCIAL CHALLENGES OF MTRC AHEAD 
In announcing the MTRC's 1999 financial results, Chairman, Mr. Jack C K So 
specially pointed out that the corporation had to work hard to achieve satisfactory 
operating results. This indicates that the management are prepared to meet the 
following challenges ahead : 
1. Sizeable capital expenditure requirement 
\ 
Currently the MTRC has a sound liquidity position. EBITDA/net interest expenses 
(times interest earned) have been maintained at a comfortable 5.06 times. Based on 
current projections, the MTRC's cash flow from the group's core railway operations 
is expected to remain reasonably steady going forward. Furthermore, significant 
cash flow is expected to be generated from property development projects along the 
Tung Chung Line and new Tseung Kwan 0 extension. Overall the MTRC's sound 
liquidity position gives it a strong capacity to meet its debt commitments on time. 
However, the MTRC has a hefty capital expenditure programme going forward. 
Following the completion of the Airport Railway (consisting of the Airport Express 
and the Tung Chung Line), MTRC is expected to enter another period of substantial 
capital expansion. Approximately HKD 32 billion funding is needed in the next four 
years for the following projects: Tseung Kwan 0 line, upgrade of existing facilities 
and extension of Kwun Tong line from Quarry Bay to North Point. A substantial part 
of the projects will be financed by debt. 
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2. Increased market competition in the midst of economic recession 
While MTRC maintains its strong market position, competition from bus compaines 
has heightened. This is particularly evident in short-haul commuting, cross-harbour 
traffic and transit from and to the airport. 
3. Political uncertainties created by the planned privatization 
There will be potential uncertainties created by the planned privatization which may 
affect investors' perception about the company during the privatization process, the 





MTRC PRIVATIZATION PLAN 
The MTRC privatization plan was officially announced on the Financial Secretary 
1999-2000 Budget Speech for the Appropriation Bill 1999 in March 3，1999. Donald 
Tsang, the Financial Secretary of Hong Kong spoke on a proposal to sale off a 
substantial minority share of the 100% government owned MTRC through public 
offer. He emphasized the main driving force of this privatization is threefold: 
- T o maximize the efficiency and competitiveness of MTRC operation; 
- T o broaden MTRC access to debt markets and to reduce its reliance on 
Government equity injection or loans for future extension developments. 
- T o relief Hong Kong Government finances over the medium term. 
Following that announcement, th^ Government selected Merrill Lynch to perform the 
financial consultancy in evaluating the financial and related aspects and impact of 
such partial privatization. Besides, the Transport Advisory Committee (TAC) and the 
LegCo Panel on Transport have been consulted on the privatization of MTRC on 22 
June 1999 and 25 June 1999 respectively. 
On September 24，1999，the Government published in the Gazette the Mass Transit 
Railway Bill for the purpose of incorporated the Mass Transit Railway Corporation 
into a newly formed Mass Transit Railway Corporation Limited (MTRCL). It was then 
introduced to the Legislative Council on October 13，1999 for first reading and 
commencement of second reading debate. 
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The third reading debate of the bill took placed on 23 February 2000. After eight 
hours of debate, LegCo passed the Mass Transit Railway Bill by vote of 34-22. All 
the amendments moved by the legislators, including three which would have altered 
the MTRC's right to set fares, were defected. It was expected that the initial public 
offering of the new limited company of MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) would be 
made in autumn of 2000. 
A summary of all the MTRC Bill Amendments and the outcomes proposed by the 
Legislators and Government in the third reading debate was listed in Table 5. 
> - T o repeal a clause on >- Benefits enjoyed by staff >- Fares to be determined by 
negligent acts or omissions by and prevailing pay review the legislature. Defeated, 
employees so no criminal mechanism to remain in force (Proposed by unionist Lau 
liability arises out of after privatisation. Approved. Chin Shek) 
negligence. Defeated. ^ Employees only liable for > MTR fares be determined 
> - O n e of the additional jail if their negligent acts or by the Chief Executive-in-
directors to be appointed by omissions result in serious Council. Defeated, 
the Chief Executive to include injuries or deaths. Approved. (Proposed by Chan Kam 
a staff representative and the (Both originally initiated by Lam of the Democratic 
maximum number of Chan Yuen Han of the Al l iance of the Betterment 
additional directors to be Federation of Trade Union. of Hong Kong.) 
ppo in ted by the Chief Proposed by Government > ^.^^^ regulation. 
Executive to increase from las tmght . Defeated. (Proposed by 
three to four. Defeated. > One of the appointed Andrew Cheng Kar Foo of 
> - S t a f f with contracts of directors of corporation be a the Democratic Party.) 
^mployment with MTRC staff representative directly ^ chief Executive-in-Council 
before pnvat.sat.on may elected by employees. determine fares if 
remain in employment and Defeated. (Proposed by Goiernment ceased to be 
t h ， seniority shall be Chan Yuen Han of the majority shareholder in the 
retained w.th pay, aNowances Federation of Trade Un.on.) cor tion. Withdrawn. 
benems and cond.t.ons of (Proposed by Choy So Yuk 
service no less favorable than \ . ^ .. u〜《 u^^ r , 
befores. Defeated. (All ?卿 8 3 3 丨 > ^ 6 = ^： ^ > 9 
proposed by Lau Chin shek ^ •‘ 
of the Confederation of 
Trade Union.) 
Source: South China Morning Post. Feb 24, 2000. 
Table 5: MTRC Bill Amendments 
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MTRC BILL IN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
The Mass Transit Railway Privatization Bill provides a legitimate ground for a new 
company to be called MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL). Legislator criticisms on 
the Bill were mostly on the areas of franchise duration; fare determination 
mechanism and regulatory framework on railway safety and passenger services. 
On the issue of franchise duration, Frontier legislator Lee Cheuk-yan questioned the 
50-year franchise of being too long when compared with the franchise periods of 
other franchise operations granted by the Government. 
Whilst the Democrat legislators including Andrew Cheng Kar-foo threatened to vote 
against the bill if LegCo was not given the final say of fare adjustment. Another 
Democrat, Albert Ho Chun Yan attempted to prevent the privatised MTRC being 
granted property development rights above new stations and along new line 
6Xt6RSiORS. 
Secretary for Transport Nicholas Ng Wing-fui defended the Bill and said that the 50 
years running line lease for building new lines was the government practice for the 
past 25 years. Mr. Ng further said the base period of MTRC used for calculating of 
the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is 40 years from commissioning, and the design 
and construction of railway projects will usually take another 10 years. He 
threatened if MTRC franchise period is to be shorted, fares will have to be set at a 
higher level to maintain the same IRR. 
On the issue of fare determination mechanism, the government reinstated that the 
average fare increase of MTRC is constantly lower than the Consumer Price Index 
(A) during the same period of time. The obligation on the Operating Agreement of 
consulting the Transport Panel and TAC before adjusting its fares is already 
sufficient. Consequently, Mr. Ng insisted to keep the status quo of the existing 
mechanism. 
Mr. Ng reminded the Legislators the discussion in the Legislative Council on 1997 
regarding the existing MTRC fare determination mechanism. A delegation of LegCo 
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Members was formed to study overseas metro systems in 1997 and the delegation 
report stated that: "there is no evidence to suggest that a Government or Parliament-
driven fare determination mechanism will necessarily result in lower subsidy with 
taxpayers' money or lower fares for commuters". 
Since the Government rallied supports from the Liberal Party, Hong Kong 
Progressive Alliance and majority of independent legislators in LegCo, and at the 
same time, all amendments were lack of cross-parties corroboration, the Bill was 
eventually approved without any amendments at all. 
MASS TRANSIT RAILWAY BILL 
Mass Transit Railway Bill is the legitimate ground of the new company. It defines the 
Government expectations to the new MTRCL as well as the inter-relationship. The 
major issues covered in the Bill are as follows: 
Grant and Extension of Franchise 
The Bill states that MTRCL will have a 50 year franchise to operate the railway and 
to construction of new extensions with referred to the terms and conditions in the 
Operating Agreement between the Government and MTRCL. 
Performance under the Franchise 
The Bill states that MTRCL will have to maintain a proper and efficient service at ail 
times. The Secretary for Transport will monitor MTRCL's compliance with its 
obligations under the Bill and the Operating Agreement. The government will impose 
financial penalties on MTRCL for any substantial or persistent non- conformances. 
Suspension, Revocation and Expiry of Franchise 
The Bills provides Government the right to suspend MTRCL franchise in the events 
of emergency or substantial breakdown in railway operation. It also authorizes the 
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Government to take possession of railway property kept by MTRCL upon revocation 
or expiry of the franchise. 
Compensation 
The Bill defines the guidance on determining the amount compensation as a result 
of government takes possession of MTRCL property. 
Safety of Railway 
The Bill provides the Secretary for Transport the authority to require MTRCL to 
rectify defects on its systems which are likely to cause a risk of injury to any person. 
Transport Interchanges 
The Bill describes the scope of transportation interchanges in the vicinities of 
MTRCL stations and of their management. 
Regulations and By-laws 
The Bill defines the Secretary for Transport and MTRCL are responsible for the 
making of subsidiary legislation to regulate matters under the Bill and the making of 
bylaws to regulate the conduct of passengers using the railway respectively. 
Vesting of Property and Transitional Arrangements 
The Bill provides the right of MTRCL to take over the whole property, rights and 
liabilities of MTRC and the transitional arrangements from MTRC to MTRCL. 
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Chapter IV 
OVERSEAS EXPERIENCES IN RAILWAY PRIVATIZATION 
Privatization of railways has been the trend since the 80s with the aim of turning 
private resource to provide public services more effectively and efficiently. A primary 
motivation has been a wide-spread belief that private sector has stronger incentives 
on cost conscious and customer oriented than a public enterprise. The most 
frequently mentioned examples of railway privatization were the British Railway 
Network and Japan National Railways. 
In additional, six case studies of privatized railways around the world prepared by 
government consultant and presented to the LegCo Transport Panel. The study was 
enclosed in Appendix 3. 
BRITISH RAILWAY NETWORK 
The plan for the privatization of British Rail was first mentioned in July 1992 on a 
British Government White Paper: New Opportunities for Railways. Under the 
Railways Act of 1993, British Rail was restructured into almost 100 separate 
companies including Railtrack, 25 train-operating companies, five freight operators, 
three rolling-stock leasing companies, and 19 maintenance suppliers between 1994 
to 1997. 
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These companies are interconnected in a complicated contractual relationship. 
Railtrack owns the railway infrastructure such as stations, track, and signalling 
equipment. It leases them to the train-operating companies that run trains in that 
area. Train-operating companies, on the other side, rent rolling stock from rolling-
stock leasing companies. Train-operating companies then themselves provide end-
service to the railroad passengers. The British Government hoped that by splitting 
British Rail into more than 100 different companies would promote competition. 
The British Government oversees the rail service operation after privatization could 
meet the customer and government demands through Rail Regulator and 
Franchising Director. The Rail Regulator is responsible for supervising the 
operations of various companies on the entire railway infrastructure, operations and 
interfaces and the Franchising Director is responsible for monitoring the standard of 
passenger services and fare determinations. 
In 1996’ most franchisees were reported with substantial increase in passenger 
volumes. First performance figures showed seven out of eight privatized routes had 
more punctual services. The new operators also promised new rolling stock, smaller 
subsidies and even lower fares. 
But after the honeymoon period was over, the services and reliability of the railway 
seems to have no improvement. The Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), 
which also monitors rail standards, reported in August 1998 that punctuality on most 
of the network has got worse than that in previous year. One customers survey 
found that the service of Connex South Eastern, which operates commuter trains 
through Kent and Sussex, was said to have deteriorated on 13 out of 15 benchmark 
standards, from staffing and safety to maintenance and availability of seats since 
privatization. 
The British railway infrastructure is also suffered from under investment after 
privatization. The Railtrack promised investment of £27 billion ($43 billion) was found 
of having two-thirds of the value in routine maintenance items. The contract fails to 
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reward new track development and thus Railtrack stops or delays the new tracks 
train operator much needed. 
Yet those franchisees were generously rewarded. The Economist on 3 July 99 has 
calculated that the main companies formed from the old British Rail made total 
profits of £1.1 billion in the year to March 31st 1998.That equals 19% of the 
industry's total revenues, including subsidies. 
In additional, the all-party Public Accounts Committee in the Parliament argued that 
British taxpayers lost almost £1 billion on the sales of British Rails rolling stock as a 
result of "sell-fast, sell-cheap" approach of the Conservative Government under John 
Major. It also means that the performance targets were set too low such that the 
train operators and Railtrack were entitled for £5.3m more in performance-related 
bonuses in the first quarter of 1998 rather than penalties for their disappointing 
performance. 
JAPAN NATIONAL RAILWAYS 
Japan National Railways (JNR) maintained a surplus from 1957 until 1969 when it 
first went into the red. After that, the company continued operating in deficit. Its 
accumulated loss and debts expanded rapidly (Fig. 1). In 1985，JNR's long-term 
debt hit ¥23,561 billion, or about US$235 billion. 
In 1982，the Second Ad Hoc Commission on Administrative Reform, an advisory 
body to the Prime Minister, firstly suggested the privatization and re-organization of 
JNR. Based on their recommendation, Supervisory Committee for JNR 
Reconstruction was set up in June 1983. The committee submitted a final report in 
July 1985 to the Prime Minister entitled "A View on JNR's Reform-Paving the Way 
for Railways in the Future". 
f 
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Illustration 4: JNR Financial Performance 1949-1985 
The objective of the reforms was to control and eliminate the financial burden 
generated by JNR to the government. The report generated many discussions in 
Japan. JNR unions and residents in rural areas were strongly opposite the 
privatization. After privatization, the JNR union members were afraid of losing their 
jobs, whilst the residents in rural areas were worried the abolishment of unprofitable 
rural railways. But as the large majority in Japan recognized that dilemma of JNR 
originated from Diet intervention and inflexibility of public-own enterprise, public 
opinions supported the reform of the state-owned JNR. 
Japan Government finally accepted the report recommendations. In 1 April 1987，the 
new Japan Railways (JR) was formed. The new JR composes of six regional JR 
passenger transport companies: JR East, JR Central and JR West in Honshu, JR 
Hokkaido, JR Shikoku and JR Kyushu; a nationwide freight transport business, JR 
Freight. Besides, a ¥1.3 trillion Management Stabilization Fund (MSF) for the three 
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island companies, a Shinkansen Holding Corporation (SHC) to lease the Tokaido, 
Sanyo, Tohoku and Joetsu shinkansen to JRs and a JNR Settlement Corporation 
(JNRSC) to assume and liquidate the old JNR debts were also formed. 
The new JRs became an immediate success. In 1987，their combined operating 
profits totaled ¥340 billion, rising to ¥900 billion in 1992. Annual average growth of 
transport volume rose sharply from 0.6% during the 5 years before privatization from 
1982 to 1986 to 4.5% during the 5 years after the privatization from 1987 to 1991. 
Passenger fares has increased only once in 1996 by 6.1% to 7.3% on the three 
island JRs on the first ten years after privatization. The fares remained stable for ten 
years on Honshu's JR. In comparison, JNR passenger fares had been increased for 
five times on the ten years before privatization. 
The success of JR after privatization is an unequivocal contradiction with the last 
day of JNR. Most of the JNR problems, including questionable government 
intervention on operating issues and new track development; poor productivity as a 
result of inflexible bureaucracy; and unconcern of ‘customer first，principle have been 
eradicated. 
However, the deposal of the former JNR debt remains a serious outstanding issue. It 
is the JNRSC that absorbed all the old JNR debt such that the new JRs could begin 
with a clean balance sheet. It was originally assumed that JNRSC could liquidate the 
old JNR debts by selling surplus land belonging to former JNR and from the listing of 
stocks in the JRs held by JNRSC. But because of the Japan government reluctance 
on selling the lands and of the delay on share listing, the long-term debts reached 
¥28.3 trillion in August 1996. 
COMPARISONS AMONG BR, JNR AND MTRC PRIVATIZATION 
The behind reasons supporting the privatization of British Railway and Japan 
National Railway were similar: political biased intervention, inefficient operation, poor 
productivity, low quality of service and high government subsidies. These factors in 
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combination impelled the government and public to reform the railway management 
and organization such that the users can obtain better service. 
The privatization results of BR and JNR are a mix. But in summary, BR service in 
the post privatization era did not improve as the government originally expected. The 
process of BR privatization was not thoroughly thought at the beginning and the 
implementation process was influenced by the government based on political 
considerations. It was expected another structurally overhaul would be necessary for 
the British railway systems in long term. On the other hand, the JR delivers much 
better service and improves in financial conditions after the privatization. It is a big 
success which Japan can illustrate to the world the advantages of privatization a 
public utilities. 
In contrast, MTRC does not experience the symptoms of a poor operated railway or 
financial difficulties similar to BR and JNR in the pre-privatization era. In fact, MTRC 
is being respected as one of the most successfully operating urban railway in the 
world. It receives no direct subsidies from the government, manages by a team of 
professional and high quality management, makes profit through railway operation 
and property development and most important of all, it sets the standard of customer 
service on world urban railroad industry. This would make a direct comparison 
among the privatization of BR, JR and MTR a difficult task. 
Commenting on MTRC privatization, the Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang, said in 
the Third Ministers' Forum on Infrastructure Development in the Asia-Pacific Region 
on 27 May 1999 that privatization is a natural progression from corporatization of 
transport infrastructure. And corporatization could free up the government's financial 
resources and help keep the size of the public service to a minimum. 
The Secretary for Transport, Mr. Nicholas Ng, on the occasion of the seconding 
reading of MTRC bill in LegCo said that MTRC privatization will offer a prime 
opportunity for the people of Hong Kong to invest in a successful business with 
strong growth potentials. The floatation of a high quality, heavily capitalized stock 
like the MTRC will add stability and diversity to the Hong Kong stock market. In 
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addition, the public offering will provide a useful boost to Government finance in the 
medium term. 
On tKe same occasion, the Secretary for Treasury, Denise Yue Chung-yee, said that 
the privatization of MTRC would widen MTRC source of financing and allow its 
passengers a promising return by investing in the company. 
It could therefore conclude Hong Kong Government primary motive of MTRC 
privatization is differed from other railway privatizations in the world. The role of 




FINANCIAL IMPACTS OF THE PRIVATIZATION 
In the partial privatization of MTRC, the government will sell part of its shareholding 
to the public; including local and global; retail or institutional investors. The amount 
and price of the shares sold are still not determined yet. Anyhow, the government 
are planning raise around 30 billion Hong Kong dollar out of the sale to fund its 
budget deficit. 
This partial privatization expected in the year 2000 should have financial impacts on 
both MTRC and the investment community. Firstly, after the share sale MTRC will 
become one of the heavy market capitalized company trading in the Hong Kong 
stock exchange where investors will value the stock prices based on the return or 
future discount cashflows. More importantly, as MTRC will become a partially-owned 
from a fully-owned government entity, how investors view the future link and 
relationship between MTRC and the Hong Kong SAR government will have strong 
impact on the valuation and credit status of MTRC. 
Here we will discuss several major financial impacts brought about by the partial 
privatization : 
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FUTURE CAPITAL RAISING COSTS AND CAPABILITIES 
At the moment MTRC enjoys the same sovereign rating of the Hong Kong SAR 
government. This status reflects the corporation's strategic importance in Hong 
Kong's transportation network, its densely populated service area, reliable and 
efficient operating record, adequate financial profile, and record of government 
support. On the other hand, this is balanced by increasing competition for patronage, 
disappointing initial performance of the new Airport Railway, and some exposure to 
property market volatility. 
Among all the factors, government support should currently be the most influential in 
determining the company's credit. As a company wholly owned by the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region government, MTRC continues to receive support from 
the government including dividend flexibility, property rights and a favourable 
regulatory environment. 
The government had announced its plan to partially privatize a substantial minority 
stake in MTRC in year 2000. While the precise impact of the privatization remains 
uncertain pending negotiation of the privatization package, the move should likely 
preserve the current credit status of MTRC based on the following reasons : 
1. Continued government support 
After the partial privatization, the HK SAR government will still be the major 
controlling shareholder of MTRC. Given MTRC's strategic importance to Hong Kong, 
the government should continue to provide necessary policy and financial support 
together with a favourable regulatory environment. 
2. Strengthened commercial practices 
Despite its current 100% share holding structure by the government, unlike a normal 
government-owned entity, MTRC has always been operating under independent 
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principles and adhering to strict commercial practices. It is required to operate 
according to prudent commercial principles and if the government directs it to act in 
a manner that would contradict this concept, the MTRC is entitled to compensation 
from the government. The MTRC also has the ability to set fares unilaterally without 
the statutory fare controls that are generally imposed on other public transportation 
companies in Hong Kong. 
This adherence to commercial principles should be strengthened even further after 
the partial privatization. With the introduction of public investors as shareholders, the 
MTRC management will be accountable for maintaining company performance and 
increasing revenues and profits. This should add to the credit-worthiness of the 
company. 
3. Long-proven management track record 
One major reason for MTRC's efficiency and effectiveness has been the 
sophisticated and prudent management in both operational and financial areas 
throughout the years. After the privatization, the quality of the management should 
be maintained or even upgraded with the introduction of some dominant investors 
into the management board (Currently the management board composition is 
appointed by the government). 
MTRC has been named the BEST Company in Hong Kong for 2 consecutive years 
in a survey conducted by Far Eastern Economic Review. The public confidence 
towards the MTRC management should continue to contribute positively towards the 
credit ratings of the company. 
4. Limited foreign exchange and interest rate exposure 
The MTRC management is committed to maintaining a high degree of operating and 
financial flexibility. The company exposure has always been managed within 
controllable limits. 
In terms of cash flows, MTRC's financing is firmly secured for the next 12 months. 
As a result, the company's balance sheet is quite flexible with comfortable cash 
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flows. The exposures to foreign exchange and interest rate are also limited. As a 
matter of principle, a minimum of 70% of the financing must be denominated in or 
swapped into Hong Kong dollars to minimize currency mismatch risk. MTRC also 
does not take non-US dollar foreign currency risk, and all financing in such 
currencies will be swapped into either US dollars or Hong Kong dollar at inception. 
MTRC's interest rate risk is also well hedged with over 50% of the outstanding debt 
in fixed rate term. All these prudent procedures for managing exposure will be and 
may be under even stricter supervision after the privatization. This is a positive 
supporting factor towards the credit rating of MTRC. 
In conclusion, we expect the credit rating and the borrowing capability of MTRC to 
be sustained after the partial privatization with continued government support and a 
competent management team. This view can be further strengthened by the 
Standard & Poor's report immediately after the passage of MTR bill on 23'^ February 
2000 (Appendix 2). 
THE FARE ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM 
The fare-setting mechanism of the MTRC is currently and will continue to be an 
important issue for local and global investors in setting their investment criteria for 
the company. 
MTRC is one of the few railway companies in the world with the ability to operate 
independently and commercially without direct subsidies from the government. This 
is a direct result of being able to operate on commercial principles, which helps to 
build the MTRC's financial and operating strengths. The current fare-setting 
mechanism allows MTRC to set fare based solely on its own discretion. This 
provides an important ground for the company to maintain stable core operating 
revenue. Over the years, MTRC has been able to increase its cash flow by capturing 
a bigger share of the market, increasing passenger volume, lowering cost, improving 
efficiency, and providing new service coverage areas. But in order to overcome 
adverse market conditions including inflation, MTRC must have the flexibility to 
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adjust its tariff rates from time to time. LegCo's decision in 1997 to maintain MTRC's 
fare setting mechanism has been critical to the investors’ support for the MTRC. 
Despite its autonomous power in setting fares, MTRC overall has exercised its right 
conscientiously and responsibly over the years, taking into account the likely 
response from the public as well as competitive pressures from other modes of 
transport. With this trustworthy track record and the government as the major 
shareholder, it is unlikely MTRC will lose this fare-setting rights after the partial 
privatization. This will be a positive factor for MTRC to maintain stable revenue amid 
changing market conditions and ensure a good response from the investor 
community during the share sale. 
Recently there have been talks in the LegCo reviewing this fare-setting mechanism 
and trying to impose constraints or regulations in changing fares. Although this 
attempt to review the fare-setting mechanism failed, there is still a possibility for 
MTRC to lose its self-determined fare setting rights after the privatization. In any 
case if the fare-setting mechanism of the MTRC is removed or restricted, there will 
be several negative impacts on the company: 
• the certainty of the company's future income will be significantly weakened 
• MTRC may need to cut back on its long-term investment or maintenance 
investment 
• without certain core operating revenue, the credit worthiness of MTRC may be 
weakened and the borrowing costs will increase as a result 
Any change in the fare-setting mechanism will have an overall negative financial 
impacts on MTRC. Financial instability of the company may result in government 
subsidy or deteriorating services which ultimately will be transferred to the general 
public. 
It is clear that the existing fare-setting mechanism has been working well and it is 
highly likely this system will continue after the privatization. However, we cannot 
ignore the possibility for a change especially when it is initiated by political reasons 
and the potential damaging financial impacts on MTRC afterwards. 
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INVESTORS，REQUIREMENT ON RETURN AND DIViDENDS 
As MTRC currently is 100% government-owned, government support has allowed 
the management to be flexible in providing return on investment and paying 
dividends. There is no doubt if private investors are introduced as new shareholders, 
they will certainly be more stringent on the future return of the company and the 
amount ofdividends they are going to receive. Comparing with the government, they 
are going to be less accommodating or supportive towards the management when 
the return is not satisfactory. 
(HKD million) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000F 2001F 2002F 
Revenues 6.253 6,574 6,981 7.252 8,293 8,879 9,456 




Operating Profit 2,490 2,602 1,875 1,454 1,732 1.894 2,025 
Operating Margin 39.8 39.6 26.9 20.0 20.9 21.3 21.4 m 
Profit on property 2 276 1,419 2,030 3,000 5,200 2,400 
development 
Gross interest 904 620 690 1,349 1,513 1,805 2,009 
expense 
Net Income 1,535 2,783 2,819 2,380 3,394 5,463 2,592 
Dividend yield 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.4% 2.3% 1.1% 
(assumed share amount 
equals $30billion; 50% net 
income retained) 
Table 6: MTRC Historical and forecast financial figures 
Source: MTRC financials and Goldman Sachs fixed income research 
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The planned privatization of MTRC will take place in autumn 2000. Apart from the 
fact that the government is planning to raise 30 billion HKD out of the share sale, not 
much has been released regarding the equity portion and the selling price of the 
shares to be sold. 
CALCULATIONS FOR THE RETURN OF MTRC SHARE 
The MTRC share can be evaluated based on its P/E ratio. Some examples of P/E 
ratio of listed utility stocks in Hong Kong are listed as follows (as of closing 15th 
March 2000): 
China Light & Power 9.6 
HK&ChinaGas 15.1 
Hong Kong Electric 9.0 
Cable & Wireless Telecom 23.0 
Hong Kong Cross Harbour Tunnel 4.7 
Kowloon Motor Bus 11.3 
Here we will try to perform some calculations for the investment return of MTRC 
share. Assume the government sells 25% of its MTRC holding in the first sale: 
Share amount placed = 30 billion HKD (25% of the equity portion) 
Net income of MTRC in 2000 = 3.4 billion (estimated projection) 
As the public investors only hold 25% of the equity, the P/E ratio of the MTRC 
shares works out to be: 30/(3.4/4) = 35.3. This P/E ratio is very high compared with 
the above other listed utility stocks (usually trading around 10-15 times). This shows 
that based on the current income projection, the MTRC may be a tough sale to the 
market compared with the other utility stocks. 
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It is also worth noting that currently being 100% owned by the HK SAR government, 
the MTRC enjoys high flexibility in declaring dividends. For example in 1999’ 
dividend was omitted in view of the significant cash outlay anticipated under the 
capital expenditure programme over the next few years. After the partial 
privatization, the MTRC will be under pressure to pay a portion of the earnings to the 
shareholders because investors of utility stocks usually require steady dividend 
return from their holdings. As a result, the MTRC will have to raise cash from 
equities or debts in order to pay dividends during periods of heavy capital 
expenditure requirements. Based on the above P/E calculation results, assume the 
MTRC will retain 50% of the earnings, the dividend yield in year 2000 can be 
estimated to be : 
Share amount placed = 30 billion HKD (25% of the equity portion) 
Net income of MTRC in 2000 = 3.4 billion (estimated projection) 
Dividend paid = Net income x 50% = 1.7 billion 
Dividend yield = Dividend paid / Share amount placed 
= ( 1 . 7 / 4 ) / 3 0 
=1 .4% 
This estimated dividend yield is relatively low compared with the other utility stocks. 
The investors will find the stocks unattractive unless either the company can achieve 
a higher earning number than expected or raise cash to increase the dividend 
payments. 
However, there are some points to note in the calculations: 
1. Due to its huge capital investment and depreciation expense as a result, some 
analysts will argue it may be more appropriate to value the shares using a 
discount cash flow model based on the EBITDA instead. 
2. The net income will be highly affected by the profit from property development. 
As shown in the table, net income in year 2001 is forecasted to be 5.5 billion due 
to a large increase in the profit from property development. 
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3. As expected the MTRC will maintain its autonomy over the fare-setting 
mechanism after the privatization. This factor will contribute to a higher P/E ratio. 
Anyhow the above calculation shows that the investors may require a higher net 
income number from MTRC to justify their investment. Higher income may be 
achieved by: 
• raise fare - expected to meet huge pressure from the public who have choices on 
other transportation modes. Also the fare-setting mechanism may not last forever 
• government subsidy - unlikely after the privatization with expected resistance 
from LEGCO members who generally support competition and open economy 
• more cheap land granted from the government - again this may meet resistance 
based on accusation of government bias towards private companies 
• cost cutting - may not be effective as depreciation and interest expense are likely 
to remain substantial after the heavy investment made during recent years 
As a result, in order to generate higher net income, the management need to resort 
to other innovative measures. This means the MTRC management will be under 
more pressure after the privatization. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE PRIVATIZATION 
In the Budget Speech on March 1999’ the Financial Secretary has highlighted the 
advantages of MTRC privatization on the improvement in efficiency and competition 
on MTR operation; and on the relief of the government financial burden. But 
privatization in fact hinges a number of social and economic concerns more than the 
government has mentioned. We foresee the privatization decision will affect the 
society of Hong Kong and the 2.3 million daily MTR users on the follow aspects: 
PUBLIC AS A USER 
As a listed company, MTRC will expect a higher rate of return. The current 3% return 
on equity in its core railway operation is unacceptable to stockholders. In a simple 
valuation of assuming 6% Hong Kong risk-free-rate, 1% annual inflation and a 3% 
equity risk premium, a reasonable rate of return of MTRCL should be about 10%. 
The demand of higher profit could be came from the following areas: 
• More flexible fare system to attract more patronage for use MTR system. As an 
example, to increase its market share on the airport commuting transport, MTRC 
has offered huge discount to all airport staff such that they can travel by Airport 
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Express at only $20 (compare with a regular price of $70) between airport to 
every MTR stations. 
• Lower the operating costs by improvement on internal productivity and 
efficiency. MTRC management will put more emphasise on the value for money 
for every decision and more willing to accept the risk arise. 
• Diversify the sources of income and reduce the dependence on passenger fare. 
In the past, MTRC did not accept advertisements on the train body and on the 
station wall because of the corporate image. But this attitude has been changed 
and revenue is getting more important. More wallpaper type of advertisements 
will therefore be posted on the trains and in stations. MTRC has even decided to 
explore on e-commerce and a final report will be concluded in June 2000. The 
new mentality of providing all kinds of new money making services, from selling 
flowers in MTR stations to commericalize MTRC internal high speed fiber optic 
network paths along MTR network to fix network providers, has been spread out 
rapidly after the announcement of privatisation. 
After privatisation, MTR quality of services will further be improved so as to 
encourage more users to travel on its system. The users will see that commercial 
principle to be more emphasised in MTRC and the new value-added services will 
provide them with extra convenience. However, increase of revenue from the new 
income sources and cost saving practices would unlikely lead to reduction on 
passenger fares for the new company has to meet a higher rate of return than it 
does currently. 
PUBLIC AS A COMMUNITY 
The community has cross-subsidised the MTR users on the construction and 
operation of MTR system. Since the planning began in the 70s，the Government has 
sunk $32 billion of equity into MTRC, of which $23.7 billion went into the link to the 
airport. MTRC has so far paid the dividend to the Government twice on 1997 and 
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1998 of $647 million and $1,252 million respectively. Certainly, no investor but the 
government could tolerate such a low return. 
In additional, the Government has financially supported railway expansion through 
granting exclusive property development rights along the tracks at below the market 
price. There were 15 projects along the airport railway, with a total of 26,000 flats 
and 1.3 million square meters office, hotel and retail space. In 1998’ the profit from 
property development reached $1.4 billion or 44% of its total profit through this 
favorable land policy for railway development. 
After privatization, the community would not subsidize the project development of a 
listed company like MTRC through indirect government supports. As a 
consequence, the government financial burden will be lowered. But meanwhile, 
MTRC will look for investors that demand a much higher return than government for 
new capital. The community has eventually to pay for the cost of running the 
underground network one way or the other: either through the government or by the 
users. And it is obvious that the community will overall pay a higher cost after 
privatization because of the involvement of profit-seeking investors. 
OTHER TRANSPORTATION MODES AS COMPETITORS 
In the late 70s and early 80s, MTRC enjoyed unfair advantages against other 
transportation carriers through government backup. In the late 70s, in order to boost 
up its patronage on Nathan corridor, the Government instructed Kowloon Motor Bus 
to cancel some of its routes running in parallel and were competing with MTRC. 
Then in the early 80s, KCRC was forced to interconnect with the MTRC at Kowloon 
Tong so as to feed passengers for the MTRC network. These could be done at the 
time that MTRC was solely owned by the Government. After privatization, the game 
rules will become more equal and will encourage more competition among different 
traffic modes. 
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It can also expect keener competitions will be arisen among different transportation 
carriers to attach more passengers. Eventually, some of them may from strategy 
alliance and provides fare discount to Octopus-using passengers that interchange 
within the alliance network. 
GOVERNMENT AS A REGULATOR 
The Transport Department will increa,se its expertise and capability to monitor the 
daily passenger services of the privatized MTRC and on its obligations as stated in 
the Operating Agreement. But as a regulator, government control on MTRC will be 
less flexible than it was. Transport Department will not be able to influence MTRC 
operating decisions or force MTRC to raise its operating standards unless a new 
franchise is under negotiating. 
Furthermore, in the competition on new railway development project such as the 
East Kowloon Line between a privatized MTRC and the government owned KCRC, 
the role of Government as a neutral regulator will be in question. Rather than making 
the decision base on a wider transportation policy and the candidate performances, 
the decision may also be based on its financial conditions. The Government may 
choose KCRC if it decides to inject capital for the new railway project and vice-versa. 
GOVERNMENT AS A SHAREOWNER 
Being a majority shareowner, the Government will appoint members and the 
Chairman to the privatized MTRC board to represent the government interest. These 
appointees will fall into the dilemma of protecting the interest of the public versa the 
interest of profit-seeking shareholders (including the government as well) when 
conflicts arise. For instance, when the board is voting for the increase the fare so 
that the rate of return could rise for another 1%, it is difficult to predict how these 




The MTRC celebrated its 20^ ^ anniversary of operations in 1999. Its track record of 
operational performance, new railway construction, financial management, customer 
service and safety has earned the distinction of being one of the world's leading 
mass transit railways. 
The contributing factors to past success can be classified into two categories: 
sophisticated management and strong government support. The former one has 
helped MTRC to achieve efficiency both operationally and financially. The latter one 
has provided MTRC with a favorable regulatory environment and continued financial 
support. As a result, MTRC manages to maintain a dominant 25% market share in 
public transportation and be one of the very few underground mass transit railways 
in the world which earns unsubsidized fare revenue plus an operating margin. 
Despite experiencing success in the first 20 years of operation. MTRC and its 
management expect to face strong challenges ahead. In 1999 net income fell 25% 
due to increased costs in depreciation and interest expenses. The company will face 
hefty capital expenditure requirements in the next few years for the construction of 
Tseung Kwan 0 line and extension of Kwun Tong line. At the same time it will face 
strong competition from improved services offered by other forms of public 
transportation. Despite signs of recovery starting to show in Hong Kong economy, 
the MTRC will have to work hard to achieve satisfactory financial results. 
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The privatization plan has also posed uncertainty on MTRC future performance. The 
impacts of the privatization will both be found internally within the organization and 
externally on the public community. We have investigated some recent overseas 
railway privatization cases. Unlike MTRC, these railway companies were poorly run 
and heavily subsidized before privatization. The results of the privatization were 
mixed but generally led to improved services and lesser financial burden. However, 
the case of MTRC is different, as the company has always been run efficiently 
without government subsidies. Actually the privatization may bring in uncertainties or 
even adverse impacts on the company and ultimately on the public community. 
The major concern over the privatization is the uncertainty over the continuation of 
the close relationship between MTRC and the HK SAR government. This 
relationship has been the basis for a favorable regulatory environment, an 
autonomous fare-setting mechanism, a cheap cost for land and a close tie with the 
urban planning projects. A more distant relationship in the future may affect the 
performance and the funding capability of the MTRC. Anyhow, we expect this 
relationship should not be deteriorated after the partial privatization because the 
government will continue to be the major shareholder; at least for 20 years as the 
government promised. 
Internally the management will be under more pressure as the corporation becomes 
partially private-owned. Financial issues like investment return and dividend 
payment will be more focused by the new shareholders. The management will need 
to think of ways to turn around from a disappointing operating performance in 1999. 
Besides cost control or raise fare, other innovative measures are necessary to 
diversify and increase revenue e.g. provides more advertising channels, develops 
telecommunication network and etc. 
Besides financial issues, the management will also counter tough organizational 
issues. Some employees may find difficult to accommodate the transition and the 
change in rationale from a 100% government-owned entity to a partially private-
owned corporation. Also corporate restructuring will be expected to control cost or 
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improve efficiency of the company. As a result, the management should monitor 
closely the morale and other motivation issues of the employees. 
Externally, the privatization will have impacts on the public community. The partially 
privatized MTRC may offer more innovative services to suit customers' needs e.g. 
internet stations, flexible fare schedules, discount etc. On the other hand, the public 
should be prepared for more frequent fare raise after the privatization. Under the 
fare-setting mechanism, the MTRC can set fare based solely on its own discretion. 
In order to boost net income and investment return of the company, fare raise is one 
of the possible options the management will resort to. 
Overall the privatization will not be totally positive for both the company and the 
public. Whilst MTRC will enjoy more flexibility on its operational strategy, it will also 
face new challenges on enriching its financial performance at the same time. 
Meanwhile, the public will see a more high quality mode of transportation at a higher 
fare price. But in all means, Hong Kong SAR Government will turn out to be the only 
certain winner. The privatization can fulfill the government's objectives in raising 
revenue to supplement budget deficit, transferring burdens of further financial 
injection on railway development to private sector and at the same time promoting 
Hong Kong status as the Asian financial hub. But with more than 2 million daily 
patronage, the importance of MTRC to Hong Kong people daily life can not be 
underrated and is therefore meaningful for the government remains to be the major 
shareholder of the privatized MTRCL. 
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APPENDIX 1 
FINANCIAL SUMMARY OF THE MTRC (1996-1998) 
BALANCE SHEET 
1996 1997 1998 
Current assets 9,022 5,863 1,873 
Long term assets 55,622 69,565 80,157 
Total assets 64,644 75,428 82,030 
Current Liabilities 8,333 6,652 8,603 
Long term debt 11,676 10,188 14,798 
Deferred liabilities 68 §8 58 
Deferred income 9,094 16,705 15,970 
Equity 35,473 41,815 42,601 
Of which revaluation 6,496 7,307 5,084 
reserve 




1996 1997 1998 
Gross revenue 6J7;] 6,574 6,981 
Total operating expenses 3,681 3,972 5,106 
Operating profit 2,490 2,602 1,875 
Other income/expenses (955) ^ ^ 944 
Profit before taxes 1 ^ 2,783 2,819 
Taxes ： ： ： 
Profit after taxes ^ ^ 2 ^ 2,819 
Dividends 647 1’252 -
CASH FLOW 
1996 1997 1998 
Cash flow from operations 5,321 2,230 4,839 
Cash flow from investing (4,192) (6,448) (14,976) 
activities 
Cash flow from financing 5,312 927 6,202 
activities 




STANDARD & POORS REPORT ON THE PASSAGE OF 
MTR BILL REGARDING PRIVATIZATION 
HONG KONG (Standard & Poor's CreditWire) Feb. 24, 2000--Standard & Poor's 
does not expect the passage of the Mass Transit Railway bill (MTR bill) to have an 
immediate effect on its single-TV-plus local currency corporate credit rating and 
single-'A' foreign currency corporate credit rating on Mass Transit Railway Corp. 
(MTRC). Standard & Poor's is awaiting the next steps in the privatization of MTRC 
prior to making a final decision on any adjustment to its credit ratings. Reflecting the 
uncertain final outcome of the privatization process, the outlook on both ratings is 
developing. 
The passage of the MTR bill on Feb. 23，2000 was a landmark event in the Hong 
Kong government's privatization plans. As expected, the new MTR ordinance 
approved by the Legislative Council of Hong Kong contains the principal legal 
structure, provides for the grant of a franchise to operate the MTR system, and 
establishes the framework for regulating railway operations after privatization. The 
passage of the MTR Ordinance is an important step in the process of MTRC's 
privatization. 
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While the passage of the MTR bill is a milestone, it forms part of a wider privatization 
process, which includes finalizing the operating agreement. Standard & Poor's will 
monitor the details arising from the operating agreement and other arrangements 
relating to the privatization process. The alignment of interests between MTRC's 
creditors and the government in terms of target returns on investment, compensation 
formulas, and the broad workings of the regulatory structure will also be examined. 
Standard & Poor's wili continue to monitor the process and assess the precise credit 
impact when the privatization package is finalized. 
Standard & Poor's full credit report on MTRC is available on the web at 




LegCo PANEL ON TRANSPORT 
OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE IN THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
RAILWAYS 
PURPOSE 
1 • At the meeting held on 28 July 1999，Members were briefed on six case studies of 
privatized railways overseas. As requested by Members, our transport consultant 
has now prepared the paper at the Annex on the impact of privatization on the 
railways concerned in respect of financial performance, quality of service, safety, 
government subsidies, fare regulation and employment. The paper is based on 
various statistics and academic studies available to the consultant. 
OBSERVATION 
2. Although the six countries in which the privatized railways are located have 
different socio-economic backgrounds, privatization has generally brought about:_ 
a. improvement in the financial performance, quality of service and safety of the 
railways; 
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b. a reduction in government subsidies for them; and 
c. enhancement in their productivity. 
ADVICE SOUGHT 




OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE IN THE PRIVATIZATION OF RAILWAYS 
The six case studies are:-
Railway/ Franchise Coverage Franchise Period Year of 
Country Privatization 
Buenos Aires~~The franchisees were granted the right Passenger Service: 1991-1995 
Commuter to operate the railway only 10 years with an 
Rail and Ownership of the railway infrastructure option to extend 
Metro and rolling stock remains with the Freight Service: 30 
/Argentina Government years with an option 
to extend 
Japan Both the operating right and the Perpetual 1987-on-going 
National ownership of the railway infrastructure 
Railways and rolling stock were transferred to the 
/Japan franchisees 
British 25 passenger service franchises were 7 years for passenger 1993-1995 
Railway granted the right to operate different service franchises 
Network /UK sections of the network 
Ownership of rolling stock was 
transferred to three private companies 
Ownership of railway infrastructure was 
transferred to a private company 
Canadian Both the operating right and the Perpetual 1995 
National ownersNp of the railway infrastructure 
/Canada and rolling stock were transferred to the 
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Railway/ Franchise Coverage Franchise Period Year of 
Country Privatization 
franchisee 
New Zealand Both the operating right and the Perpetual 1993 
Railways ownership of the railway infrastructure 
/New Zealand and rolling stock were transferred to the 
franchisee 
Massachu- The franchisee was granted the right t o ~ ~ 3 years, extendable""" 1964 (the year 
setts Bay operate the railway only for another two years when MBTA 
Transportatio Ownership of the railway infrastructure was formed) 
n and rolling stock remains with 




2. Privatization has generally brought about substantial improvement in the financial 
performance of these once government-owned railways:-
Country Pre-privatization Post Privatization 
Buenos Aires Loss at US$829 million (1992) Figure Not Available 
Commuter Rail and 
Metro /Argentina 
Japan National Loss a t¥ 1,850 billion(1985) Profits of¥471 billion(1990) 
Railways /Japan 
British Railway Network~~Loss at £108 million after receiving Profits of £1,100 million after 
/UK government cash grants of £704 receiving government cash grants 
million (1994) of£1,400 million (1998) 
Canadian National Operating Profit of Cdn $235 Operating Profit of Cdn $569 million 
/Canada million(1994) (1998) 
New Zealand Railways~~Profits of NZ $33 million (1993) Profits of NZ $82 million (1998) 
/New Zealand 
Massachusetts Bay Two-thirds of operating costs No change 
Transportation Authority funded by government subsidies 
Railway /US 
Quality of Service 
3. In general, the quality of service has improved with privatization in all the six 
cases:-
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a.Buenos Aires Commuter Rail and Metro / Argentina 
The quality of service has improved dramatically. Prior to privatization, the railway 
operations were plagued by a lack of investment and maintenance. The new private 
operators have made significant investments to improve the systems. For commuter 
rail, punctuality rose from 77 percent in 1993 to 96 percent in 1997. The number of 
cancelled and delayed trains dropped by 80 percent during the same period. For 
metro service, the duration of interrupted service and the number of interruptions per 
car-km declined by 37 percent and 62 percent respectively between 1993 and 1998. 
b.Japan National Railways / Japan 
According to a study by T. Yamamotoi, increase in passenger volume ranged from 
by 2% to 6% between 1987 and 1989’ far exceeding the growth rates achieved 
before privatization. This can be taken as an indication of the success of the 
privatized rail companies in attracting patronage by improving their services. 
C.British Railway Network I UK 
The UK privatization has not been a complete success. Out of the 77 route groups, 
37 route groups registered decline in reliability and 45 route groups recorded decline 
in punctuality in 1998. Of the 24 passenger service operators which conducted 
customer satisfaction surveys, over 20% showed consistent decline in the level of 
customer satisfaction. There were also over 1 million complaints from railway 
passengers in 1998. Critics have attributed such woeful performance to the 
fragmentation of the companies and lack of adequate preparation for privatization. 
d.Canadian National I Canada 
The performance of the railway services has generally improved since privatization. 
Canadian National has undertaken different measures to improve its service quality 
and customer satisfaction. For example, the service redesign plan implemented 
since September 1998 has reduced the average delivery time by 24 hours. 
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e.New Zealand Railways / New Zealand 
Freight car loading time has reduced by almost 40 percent. 
f.Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Railway / US 
The stipulation of minimum performance standards required of the franchisee has 
made it easier for the regulator to monitor the quality of the service for the purpose 
of ensuring that passengers' demands are met. 
Safety Performance 
4. In all the overseas cases, with the exception of Argentina, the railway 
infrastructures were generally well maintained and safety was not a matter of 
concern prior to privatization. There is evidence that in some cases safety standards 
have improved after privatization:-
a.Buenos Aires Commuter Rail and Metro / Argentina 
Higher investment, on technology in particular, and better maintenance have led to 
improved safety. 
b.Japan National Railways / Japan 
According to the study by T. Yamam0t0i, the number of railway accidents, especially 
those at crossing points which account for 90% of all accidents, has decreased since 
privatization. 
C.British Railway Network I UK 
There is no evidence to prove that safety has improved or deteriorated since 
privatization. But the commuting public are worried about safety problems arising 
from the breaking up of the operation into several streams，each responsible for 
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different aspects of the operation. When a safety problem arises, the different 
operators will tend to blame one another. 
d.Canadian National / Canada 
Canadian National remains one of the railroads in North America with the lowest 
ratio of train accidents per train-mile. 
e.New Zealand Railways / New Zealand 
No concrete evidence to show if safety has changed since privatization. 
f.Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Railway / US 
No concrete evidence to show if safety has changed since privatization. 
Subsidies 
5. Generally, privatization is accompanied by a significant reduction in government 
subsidies to the privatized railways, with the notable exception of the UK case. 
Country ~~Amount of Subsidy Before~~ Amount of Subsidy After 
Privatization Privatization 
Buenos Aires US$ 829 million(1992) Under US$ 200 million (1995) 
Commuter Rail and 
Metro /Argentina 
Japan National ¥600 billion (1985) ¥157 billion (1990) 
Railways/Japan 
British Railway £704 million(1994) £1,400 million(1998) 
Network/UK 
Canadian National No subsidies No change 
/Canada 
New Zealand Railways For urban passenger services, l o c a l ~ No change 
/New Zealand governments paid subsidies to cover 
the differences between the operating 
costs and fare revenue 
Massachusetts Bay Approximately two-thirds of operating No change 




6. Generally, privatization is accompanied by liberalization of fare and other 
economic regulations: 
Country Fare-setting Body & Fare Legislature's 
Determination Mechanism Involvement 
Buenos Aires Fares are set by negotiations between Approval by legislature is 
Commuter Rail and franchisees and the Secretary of Transport. not required. 
Metro /Argentina Increases are generally capped at inflation, but 
there is a mechanism to allow increases in 
excess of inflation if service quality improves. 
Secretary of Transport approves fare increases 
based on service performance of the 
franchisees. 
Japan National Prior to privatization, fare increases were the Approval by legislature is 
Railways /Japan object of political maneuvering during Diet not required. 
deliberations. 
After privatization, the Ministry of Transport 
approves fare increases. For discounted fares, 
operators are required to give written notice only. 
British Railway The Franchising Director, an independent Approval by legislature is 
Network /UK regulatory agency, regulates fares. Fare not required. 
increases are governed by the franchise 
agreement to ensure that the fare levels are 
reasonable. In determining whether fares are 
reasonable, the Franchising Director applies the 
following two objectives: 
a) passengers pay the right amount for service 
provided; and 
b) the profit of the regulated companies is not 
affected by tightly constrained fare levels. 
Fare increases are capped at inflation for the first 
3 years and inflation less 1% for the following 
four years. 
Franchisees are allowed to adjust fares for 
different classes of services so long as the 
average fare level remains the same. 
Canadian National Regulation offreight rates relies principally on Approval by legislature is 
/Canada the competition between the two major railway not required. 
companies. 
"New Zealand Fare levels are negotiated between local Approval by legislature is 
Railways /New governments and New Zealand Railways. not required. 
Zealand 
Massachusetts Bay Fares are set by the Board of Directors, who are Approval by legislature is 
Transportation appointed by the local authorities which provide not required. 
Railway /US subsidies to MBTA. 
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Impact on Employment 
7. Privatization of railways has brought substantial enhancement in productivity to 
the formerly government-owned railways: 
Country Number of Employees ~~Number of Employees~~ 
Before Privatization After Privatization 
Buenos Aires Commuter Rail 12,600(1993) 9,470(1997) 
and Metro /Argentina (_25%) 
^ i S ~ ~ N a t i o n a l ~ ~ R a i l w a y s 200,000(1987) 185,000(1997) 
/Japan {-l.b%) 
British Railway Network/UK"一 128,000(1994) 67,000(1997) 
(-48%) 
"cinirdian National /Canada 29,884(1994) 21,514(1998) 
• (-28%) 
"Ni^TZealand Railways /New 5,648(1992) 4,698(1998) 
Zealand H?。/。) . _ 
Massachusetts Ba7^ Impact of commercialization is not readily available as significant 
Transportation Authority service expansions have clouded the impact of reduction in 
Railway /US employment. 
-End -
Mercer Management Consulting 
October 1999 
1 [The Political Economy of Privatization (London: Rontledge, 1993).] 
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